P&G Japan Essay

Slow, conformist and risk averse stretch, intro and speed leading Innovation Team implemented a globose rollout of Dryel and Swiffer Impact 18 months after entering the first test food market they were on gross revenue in US, atomic number 63, Latin America and Asia Processes Performance-based component of compensation increased from handed-down range of 20% to 80%. Extended the reach of stock options to almost all employees Integrated business planning process where all work out elements of the operating plan could be reviewed and approved together Structure old profit responsibility shifted from P&Gs four regional organisation to sevensome GBUs that would now manage harvest-festival development, manufacturing and marketing of their respective categories worldwide charged with standardising manufacturing processes, simplifying commemorate portfolios and coordinating marketing activities Eliminate bureaucracy and increase answerability Committee responsibilities were tra nsferred to individuals Activities such as accounting, human resources, payroll and much of IT were unified through a global business service unit procession form Ethnocentric/Polycentric- Regiocentric Geocentric SK-II within P&G this high-end product had little visibility outside lacquer Because Japanese women had by faraway the highest use of debaucher care products in the world, it was natural that the global hit care category management started to regard Max Factor Japan as a potential source of innovation Working with R&D labs in Cincinatti and the UK, several Japanese technologists participated on a global team that developed a new product involving a permanent color base and renewable moisturising second coat LipfinityJapanese innovations were than transferred worldwide, as Lipfinity rolled out in Europe and the US within half a dozen months of the Japanese launch Implementation of O2005 in July 1999 half the top 30 managers and a third of the top 3000 were new to their jobs capabilities do not house in management Global product development process engineering team assembled at an R&D facility in Cincinnati, skeleton the most qualified technologists from its P&G labs worldwide US-based marketing team and Japanese team had the same task Japanese team came up with SK-IIIn the end, each market ended up with a unmistakable product built on a common technology platform. merchandise expertise was also shared, allowing the organisation to exploit topical anaesthetic learning Decisions Japanese Opportunity Tapping into P&Gs extensive technological resources extend the SK-II line beyond its traditional product offerings Although would take a considerable amount of beat and effort, it would exploit internal capabilities and external brand image Product innovation and superior in-store service competitive advantage in Japanmainland China Operating since 1988 only Entrepreneurial beauty care manager in China Some were worried that SK-II would b e a distraction to P&Gs strategy of becoming a mainstream Chinese company and to its competitive finishing of entering 600 Chinese cities ahead of competitors Targeting an elite consumer group with a corner product was not in keeping with the objective of reaching the 1. 2 billion population with laundry, hair care, oral care, diapers and other basics Europe De Cesare new the European market wellWithout any real brand awareness or heritage, would SK-IIs mystique transfer to a Western market Organisational constraint De Cesare recognised that his decision needed to comply with the organisational reality in which it would be implemented Jager openly questioned how well some of the products in the beauty care business fit in the P&G portfolio the fashion-linked and promotion-driven gross sales models neither played well to P&Gs dope it high, sell it cheap marketing skills nor exploited its superior technologies From a local to a global focus